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Can concern with relative standing, which has been shown to influence consumption and
labor supply, also increase borrowing and the likelihood of financial distress? We find
that perceived peer income contributes to debt and the likelihood of financial distress
among those who consider themselves poorer than their peers. We use unique responses
describing perceived peer characteristics from a Dutch population-wide survey to handle
two major challenges of uncovering social interaction effects on borrowing: (1) debts,
unlike conspicuous consumption, are often hidden from peers and (2) location is missing
in anonymized data. We employ several approaches to uncover exogenous, rather than
correlated, effects. (JEL G11, E21)
The role of relative standing has been explored in many contexts, including
consumption behavior and labor supply,1 but less attention has been paid to how
“catching up” or “keeping up” with peers is financed. In particular, almost no
attention has been paid to whether perceptions of relative standing contribute to
borrowing and to the potential for financial distress. Are people who perceive
themselves as poorer than their social circle more likely to borrow and, if
We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Alexander Ljungqvist (editor) for their very helpful comments.
We would also like to thank Rob Alessie, Bas Donkers, Steven Durlauf, Jordi Gali, John Gathergood, Luigi
Guiso, Yannis Ioannides, Mauro Mastrogiacomo, Luigi Pistaferri, Nikolai Roussanov, Dorothea Schäfer, Jan
Sokolowsky, Kostas Tatsiramos, and seminar participants at the Sloan Conference on Household Behaviour
in Mortgage and Housing Markets, Saïd Business School, Oxford, European Economic Association Annual
Congress in Malaga, CeRP Conference on Financial Literacy, Saving and Retirement in an Ageing Society,
Turin, NETSPAR International Pension Workshop, Amsterdam; Behavioral Finance Conference, DIW, Berlin,
10th Conference on Economic Theory and Econometrics (CRETE), Greece, Association of Southern European
Economic Theory (ASSET) conference in Evora, Portugal, DFG Conference in Cologne, GSEFM conference in
Mainz, IAES Conference in Istanbul, Universities of Bath, Freiburg, Southampton, Vienna and Rotterdam, CPB in
Den Haag, HFC Network at the European Central Bank, and at the research department of Deutsche Bundesbank.
M. H. acknowledges research funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG). Send correspondence to
Dimitris Georgarakos, House of Finance, Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; telephone:
+49-69-798-34011. E-mail: georgarakos@hof.uni-frankfurt.de.
1 For instance, models with interdependent preferences have been applied to consumption (Abel 1990; Gali 1994),
asset pricing (Campbell and Cochrane 1999), supply of labor (Neumark and Postlewaite 1998), work efforts
(Cohn et al. 2011), and investing in assets (Duflo and Saez 2002; Kaustia and Knüpfer 2012).
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu014
 RFS Advance Access published February 25, 2014
 at U
niversitÃ  di Venezia on February 27, 2014
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
[12:07 21/2/2014 RFS-hhu014.tex] Page: 2 1–30
The Review of Financial Studies / v 0 n 0 2014
so, to borrow more relative to what is typically associated with their own
resources and characteristics? Does such socially induced borrowing contribute
to a worsening of indicators of potential financial distress, such as the debt-
to-income and loan-to-value ratios? This study uses unique, population-wide
survey data and a battery of statistical approaches to examine the role of such
social effects on borrowing.
Investigating the influence of social interactions on debt behavior presents at
least two major challenges. First, many households are willing to display their
assets and consumption but prefer to leave any debts undisclosed. Thus, it makes
sense to look for evidence that households adjust their debt behavior not to the
debts of their peers per se but to their perception of relevant peer characteristics.
In the Manski (1993) terminology, instead of “endogenous effects”, one needs
to focus on “exogenous (or contextual) effects.”
Asecond challenge has to do with the scarcity of location information. In view
of privacy laws dictating anonymity of information, data collectors typically
remove location details, but this step makes it impossible to identify a circle
of “neighbors” or “colleagues” at work. Existing studies that examine social
influences on consumption or assets typically define a social circle based on
sample units with a common set of characteristics (e.g., age and education).
A number of researchers have focused instead on a special population group
and a financial asset class observed by peers, whereas others have examined
sociability as a factor facilitating the collection of asset-relevant information.2
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the influence
of social interactions and comparison effects on borrowing behavior. Our
study focuses on peer income, rather than peer debts, which are typically
unobservable, and exploits a unique feature of our data, namely, that the
respondents report various characteristics of their (unnamed) peers as these
respondents actually perceive them.
We use data from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DNBHS),
which is representative of the entire Dutch-speaking population, and we
examine the role of perceived relative standing for collateralized loans
and consumer (uncollateralized) loans. We find that once we control for
demographics, resources, region, time fixed effects, region-specific time trends,
and other factors that typically determine borrowing needs, a higher average
income in the social circle, as perceived by a household, increases a household’s
tendency to borrow.3 Not only is this influence significant among those who
perceive their income to be below average for their social circle, it also extends
2 See, for example, the seminal papers by Duflo and Saez (2002), focusing on librarians and a specific retirement
product, and by Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), focusing on sociability.
3 The estimated effects are sizeable for both collateralized and consumer debt: a 1,000 euro increase in the perceived
monthly average household income of peers (corresponding to 0.85 of one standard deviation of peer income)
is estimated to raise the unconditional likelihood of having collateralized (uncollateralized) loans by 10% (7%).
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to the likelihood of future financial distress, indicated by the debt service ratio
and the loan-to-value ratio.
We verify the robustness of these results using several approaches, including
instrumental variable estimation and placebo tests. Our aim is to rule out
uninteresting alternative explanations of the peer-income–own-borrowing
relation and address the potential for reverse causality or spurious correlation
between the two, because of similarities in unobserved characteristics with
those of peers.
We stress that the research question of social influences on debt is distinct
from that relating to consumption; concern with relative standing may lead to
greater consumption, but it need not lead to a greater tendency to borrow or
to run into financial distress for at least three reasons. First, households can
increase labor supply, leaving room for an increase in both consumption and
saving. For example, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) find that married women
in the United States are 16% to 25% more likely to work outside the home if
their sisters’ husbands earn more than their own. Even a positive labor supply
response can imply either more or less saving/borrowing.4 Second, households
may choose to reduce saving but may not be willing or able to raise borrowing
in response to status concerns. Third, even if borrowing is undertaken to keep up
with peers, it may not significantly increase the potential for financial distress.
Our paper offers clues as to how comparison-motivated consumption is
financed and provides the debt counterpart to analyses of the socially induced
asset choices of households. Duflo and Saez (2002) demonstrate that individual
participation in retirement investment plans is influenced by colleagues’
participation choices. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) show that more sociable
individuals are more likely to own stocks.5 In both cases, the likely mechanism
is one of emulating peers’ asset choices once these are observed, a channel
much less likely to be relevant for unobserved debts.
The importance of peer income for consumption was first formalized in
Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income hypothesis.According to this hypothesis,
households with incomes below average in their social circle tend to consume
a larger share of their income to keep up with peers. Recent work by Kuhn
et al. (2011) finds that exogenous variations in income from winning a Dutch
postal lottery tend to influence not only the durables purchased by winners but
also the probability that neighbors will buy a new car. The financing of the
neighbors’ induced spending is not explored.
Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) show that the desire to signal status
can explain why minority races in the United States tend to spend larger
4 Most existing theoretical models, which are based on an infinite-horizon representative agent, imply greater
consumption, less leisure, and greater accumulation of assets to keep up with the Joneses, both now and in
the future (Liu and Turnovsky 2005). When Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2008) consider overlapping
generations in an infinite-horizon economy, however, they find less leisure but also less saving.
5 See also Brown et al. (2008) and Georgarakos and Pasini (2011).
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fractions of their budgets on conspicuous consumption than do whites with
similar permanent incomes. Such outlays are financed through lower minority
spending on other items (particularly health and education) and through savings,
although the extant research does not investigate borrowing.6
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the unique features of
our data set. Section 2 discusses possible channels through which peers might
influence borrowing behavior and the econometric approach taken to address
a number of challenges. Section 3 presents the baseline results on the relation
between peers’ income and debt behavior, whereas Section 4 reports the results
of the placebo tests and additional robustness checks. Section 5 shows the
asymmetric effects on borrowing across households poorer and richer than the
peer average and inspects likely channels through which peer income operates.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
1. The Data
The DNBHS, launched in 1993, provides a unique data set that includes
information on work, pensions, housing, mortgages, incomes, assets,
consumer loans, health, economic, and psychological concepts, and personal
characteristics. Thus, it allows the study of both the psychological and
economic aspects of financial behavior. The initial survey was administered
to roughly 2,790 Dutch households oversampled from the top 10% of the
income distribution and weighted to be representative of the Dutch-speaking
population. Since then, households have been reinterviewed annually, with
new households added each year to counteract nonnegligible attrition and
keep the cross-sectional sample representative. Because the survey underwent
major refreshing in 2001, resulting in a sample of 1,861 households, we
pool data from the 2001 to 2008 waves, which cover a period of relatively
stable employment rates and increasing housing prices.7 After excluding
households with incomplete questionnaires or missing information on social
circle characteristics, the sample used in the baseline estimations consists of
approximately 4,500 households.
This survey not only includes an extensive questionnaire on income and
real and financial wealth holdings but also asks specific debt-related questions.
These responses allow us to distinguish between two types of formal borrowing:
collateralized and uncollateralized loans.8 Table 1 provides summary statistics
6 A link between conspicuous consumption and borrowing is addressed, however, in the theoretical model of status
developed by Rayo and Becker (2006), who argue that, to signal status to more people over a longer period of
time, conspicuous consumption goods tend to be durable, which often requires borrowing finance.
7 Unemployment rates in the Netherlands reached a minimum of 3% in 2008 but increased to 3.7% and 4.5% in
2009 and 2010, respectively. National housing prices increased, on average, by roughly 2% each year until 2008,
after which they declined by 2.8% in 2009 and by 3.4% in 2010.
8 The survey also collects information on informal loans from family and friends, which show relatively low
prevalence (4%).
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Table 1
Prevalence and amount of borrowing by loan type
Panel A: Collateralized loans
Conditional amounts outstanding
Prevalence (%) Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 37.81% 105,038 44,857 83,118 131,934
2002 43.22% 113,177 45,760 89,288 139,512
2003 43.12% 113,921 44,298 90,757 146,940
2004 40.96% 110,673 46,562 92,065 145,405
2005 41.25% 118,971 51,238 100,384 156,851
2006 40.69% 117,246 49,353 100,763 159,370
2007 41.02% 132,048 59,944 111,760 181,864
2008 40.92% 132,920 61,750 120,000 180,000
Total 41.15% 117,926 48,620 98,293 156,664
Panel B: Consumer loans
Conditional amounts outstanding
Prevalence (%) Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 22.24% 11,451 956 4,486 11,610
2002 24.62% 9,448 843 4,659 12,344
2003 25.86% 13,030 918 4,415 13,487
2004 25.09% 11,315 835 4,021 11,794
2005 19.13% 14,957 1,045 4,273 12,548
2006 18.64% 11,267 853 4,138 12,287
2007 20.57% 11,196 889 3,835 11,379
2008 20.33% 12,008 680 3,750 11,206
Total 22.09% 11,793 875 4,181 12,155
Weighted statistics from waves 2001–2008 of DNBHS data. Amounts refer to constant 2008 euro.
on the prevalence and outstanding amounts among debt holders by survey
year and by loan type. These figures suggest a relatively stable prevalence of
both types of loans over the years studied. Collateralized debts account for most
household borrowing, being held by approximately 40% of the households, with
a median conditional outstanding amount of approximately 98,000 euro. One
out of five Dutch households has consumer loans, with a median outstanding
amount of approximately 4,000 euro.9
In the absence of information on respondents’ perceptions of peers,
the empirical network literature typically constructs hypothesized social
circles based on sorting assumptions (e.g., age-education cells or geographic
proximity). One unique feature of the Dutch survey most relevant for our
purposes here is that individuals are asked to explicitly report a number of
characteristics about those with whom they “associate frequently, such as
friends, neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people at work.” This subjective
information can be particularly helpful for understanding who interacts with
whom and circumvents the key issue of defining the social circle. Indeed,
Soetevent (2006) stresses the potential of such questions for social interaction
9 Extended lines of credit (unrelated to home equity) account for roughly 40% of the average outstanding volume
of consumer loans, followed by almost 20% from checking account overdrafts. Student loans account for 17%,
and private loans account for 12%. Only 6% relate to outstanding credit card debts.
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models, whereas Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) exploit such subjective
information from the DNBHS to assess peer effects on the female labor supply.
Being specific, respondents report their perceptions of the average annual total
net household income among people in their social circle, which is recorded
in one of eleven income brackets (see Appendix A). Other questions cover the
age category of most members of their social circle, as well as the average
household size, average education, most prevalent type of employment, and
average hours of work per week of their peers distinguished by gender. The
survey also asks directly about respondents’ interactions with peers in relation
to exchanging financial information or informal borrowing, perceptions of the
social circle’s spending ability, and expectations about their own future income.
We use this information in the empirical analysis to shed light on the process
through which social interactions influence borrowing behavior.
2. Effects of the Social Circle on Debt Behavior
2.1 Possible channels
The asset market participation and holdings of peers may influence a member of
the peer group via direct observation of financial behavior, information sharing,
and dissemination of social norms. However, peer effects in borrowing behavior
are much less likely to emanate from direct observation of peers’ loans or even
from discussions with them about their indebtedness. That is, loans, unlike
assets, are not directly observable by third parties and can only become known
if borrowers decide to reveal them, but borrowers are less likely to discuss
their loans than exhibit their assets because of embarrassment or shame.10
Nonetheless, financial advice and consultation with members of the social circle
may inform households about the process of obtaining loans and/or about the
social norms of borrowing. We can explicitly take this possible channel of
effects into account because our data allow us to identify households that consult
family, friends, and acquaintances about financial decisions and that can borrow
from their social circle in the future.
Even households that do not consult their social circle may still be influenced
by that circle’s observable behavior when deciding whether to take out a loan
and how much to borrow. Households form perceptions about acquaintances’
average disposable income based on sources of social interaction ranging from
direct knowledge of acquaintances’ pay scales to open discussions with friends
and family and inferences about income levels from observed spending or asset
accumulation patterns. Because the DNBHS asks respondents directly about
the perceived average income of their acquaintances, we can directly assess
the influence of these perceptions on their borrowing behavior. In doing so,
we assume that perceptions of higher peer income may contribute positively
10 Collins et al. (2009) find that even in developing countries with weak credit markets many indebted households
feel ashamed to ask relatives for additional credit in order to not reveal their financial situation.
6
 at U
niversitÃ  di Venezia on February 27, 2014
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
[12:07 21/2/2014 RFS-hhu014.tex] Page: 7 1–30
Household Debt and Social Interactions
to borrowing through three possible channels: trying to emulate the spending
or living standards of acquaintances (a comparison effect), inferring that more
can be borrowed directly from them in the future, and inferring that one’s own
future income is likely to move in the same direction as that of one’s social
circle (an expectation or “tunnel effect” in the terminology of Hirschman and
Rothschild 1973).11
With reference to the first channel, a spending behavior or visible
accumulation of assets (like housing) by members of a social circle may well
induce a household to borrow to match (or exceed) it. Our data allow us to
observe respondents’ perceptions of peers’ spending ability and to take them
into account in our estimation for consumer debt (unfortunately, we cannot
gain similar insights for collateralized debt, given that we do not observe
respondents’ perceptions of peers’ housing or living standards). The data do
allow us to directly address the second channel, using household responses on
whether they are in a position to borrow a significant amount of money from
friends and relatives. In regard to the third channel, we first use households’
reported expectations about their own future income and then examine the
robustness of our results using a measure of respondents’ permanent incomes
rather than expected future incomes.
2.2 Econometric specification
Our aim is to examine whether households’ own borrowing decisions are
influenced by the (perceived) average income of their peers. Following the
notation of Moffitt (2001), suppose that there are g=1,...,G peer groups and
i =1,...Ng households in each group. In our baseline specification, we estimate
equations of the following type:
yig =βxxig +γxxg +Z
′
1,igβ+Z
′
2,gγ +εig, (1)
where yig denotes either a binary ownership indicator or the outstanding
amount of a particular loan type; xig is the household’s own income; and
xg is the perceived average income of the household’s peers. Z1,ig and Z2,g
represent two vectors with additional household and peer group characteristics,
respectively.12 εig denotes the error term. Households are asked directly to
provide an estimate of the income of their peers: “If you think of your circle of
acquaintances, how much do you think is the average total net income per year
11 Hirschmann and Rothschild stress utility-enhancing “anticipatory feelings” (Caplin and Leahy 2001), analogous
to those felt by an individual who, caught in a traffic jam in a tunnel, sees another lane moving and anticipates
that her own line will also move soon. Senik (2004) finds empirical support for the “tunnel effect” using survey
data from Russia.
12 Household own characteristics include age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, number of children,
self-reported health, labor status, whether last year’s income was unexpectedly low, whether the household
expects to borrow from peers in the future, whether it gets financial advice from peers, and net financial and real
wealth. Peer group characteristics consist of average education of peers (in baseline specifications), as well as
peer average age, household size, and employment status in robustness specifications (presented in Section 4).
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of those households?” The possible answers are presented in brackets. In our
reported results, we use the midpoints of these bands, adjusted for inflation. In
the Appendix, we detail a number of robustness checks that employ different
specifications of this variable.13 In terms of Equation (1), given that each
household provides a direct average estimate of its own peers’ characteristics,
the peer sample size for each household is one. Importantly, using such a directly
elicited measure circumvents the issue of identifying the characteristics of the
peers with which each household actually interacts.
The extant literature on social interactions in consumption or asset investing
focuses on uncovering what Manski (1993) calls “endogenous social effects”,
namely, the direct effects of observing others’ behavior (e.g., consumption or
asset holdings) on one’s own actions.14 Econometric modeling in this context
must address the reflection problem generated when the behavior of households
in a group is expressed as a function of the average behavior of the group that
includes them (i.e., adding yg on the right-hand side of Equation 1). Given
that debts, as discussed earlier, are typically unobservable by other social
circle members, our primary focus is on uncovering exogenous or contextual
effects (γx in our model), that is, influences on debt behavior that emanate
from observing (or forming perceptions of) average peer income, xg .15 In this
setting, the two major challenges are to rule out (1) spurious links between peer
income and the respondent’s own borrowing behavior that have little to do with
a comparison effect and (2) correlated effects, an association between these two
variables stemming from similarities in the unobserved characteristics of the
respondent or respondent’s environment and those of peers.
One standard, albeit uninteresting, potential source of an effect of peers’
higher perceived income on borrowing relates to an adverse idiosyncratic
shock; that is, once income is controlled for, the higher the perceived average
income of peers is, the greater the chance is that the household has experienced
a bad idiosyncratic shock during this period. In such a case, standard models
would prescribe more borrowing to smooth any adverse transitory shock.
We control for this possibility by including self-reported health, labor market
status dummies, and, most especially, answers to a direct question on whether
last year’s income was “unusually low” in our specifications. In addition, as
described in Section 4, we estimate models that control for a household’s
permanent income proxy that is more resilient to temporary shocks.
13 We experiment, for example, with using dummy variables for income bands and a flag dummy for “don’t know”
responses, but the results are insensitive to these variations.
14 For thorough reviews of methodological issues in social interaction models, see Soetevent (2006) and Durlauf
and Ioannides (2010).
15 Note that in a probit model for the likelihood of having a loan, the reflection problem cannot occur, given that
the expected outcome is a nonlinear function of the individual level variables, except for nongeneric cases for
the density of model errors, e.g., uniform density (Brock and Durlauf 2001a, 2007). In addition, the reflection
problem does not occur when we use linear models to estimate Equation (1) as long as there are elements in
Z1,ig whose averages do not appear in Z2,g (see Brock and Durlauf 2001b, their Theorem 6; Blume et al. 2011,
their Theorem 1).
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Another possibility is that the respondent’s perception of higher income in
the social circle partly reflects a macro or regional shock, such that perceptions
could improve simply based on better performance in the macroeconomy or the
region in which most of the social circle is located. We take these two channels
into account flexibly by including both year and province fixed effects in all our
specifications. To account for any region-specific time trends that may correlate
with trends in both peer income and borrowing (e.g., more rapid housing price
appreciation in certain regions), we condition our specifications on a full set of
interaction terms between province and year fixed effects.16
A more complex potential channel for an association between peer income
and borrowing is correlated effects; that is, there may be unobserved factors
that influence both the desire to borrow and the desire to associate with certain
groups of peers. The presence of such unobserved factors will render standard
estimates of γx inconsistent, whereas the direction of the induced bias will be
unknown (for more details, see Appendix C).
We also consider the possibility of reverse causality; households may borrow
with the specific aim of associating with people whom they perceive as earning
more, or households may come to think of their peers as having more income
because they borrow. Therefore, we consider both possibilities: correlated
effects and reverse causality.
One possible approach to addressing the former would be to allow for
peer group fixed effects; however, because this method cannot also handle
potential reverse causality, it is not the most suitable choice for our data.
Moreover, this method’s application would require that the peer groups be
either known or assumed and that the (observable) variation within them
be sufficient to identify the causal relation of interest.17 A key advantage of
our data is that they allow us to avoid making arbitrary assumptions about
the identity of peers or respondents’ perceptions of peers because they ask
respondents directly about their perceptions of peer characteristics. However,
our data record perceptions regarding the average characteristics of peers—
not variation within a given peer group. Thus, applying this method would be
inconsistent with exploiting the strengths of our data. Rather, we pursue two
alternative ways to address identification in the presence of correlated effects:
instrumental variable estimation, which also addresses concerns of possible
reverse causality, and estimation of peer income’s influence using a series of
placebo regressions.
With reference to the instrumental variable estimation, our identification
strategy exploits variations in local labor market conditions and the asymmetric
16 When modeling collateralized borrowing, we also conduct a series of robustness checks to examine the sensitivity
of our results to the inclusion of certain relevant regional indicators and to a specific functional form of time
trends (i.e., instead of the general form adopted in the baseline regressions).
17 See, for example, Lundborg (2006) and Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), who use school-grade (or class) fixed
effects and exploit the variation within classmates to assess health behavior among adolescents in schools.
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effects that these can have for the incomes of households with different
educational backgrounds. That is, a given difference in educational attainment
between respondent and peers can imply a larger difference in (perceived)
incomes in regions with better conditions for highly educated workers. For
example, unanticipated positive shocks to earnings of workers in high-tech
sectors could induce their less educated peers working in other sectors to
borrow more in order to keep up. Note that, in the data, we do not observe the
sector in which respondents and their peers work. Thus, we use the interaction
between regional employment rates in high-tech sectors and the difference in
educational attainment between each respondent and his peers as an instrument.
At the same time, we control for the respondent’s own educational attainment
and occupational status, for peers’ average level of educational attainment, for
province and time fixed effects, and for the entire set of interactions between
province and time fixed effects.18
Finding appropriate instruments is usually a difficult task and in what follows
we discuss assumptions that can support our choice. First, the validity of the
instrument rests upon the assumption that it is relevant. That is, the educational
gap between a respondent and peers must raise the respondent’s perception
of peers’ average income and even more so when the regional employment
share in high-technology occupations, for which education matters greatly, is
larger.19 Indeed, results from the auxiliary regression (presented in Table 2C)
support this assumption, as they suggest a strong positive association between
our instrument and the perceived income of peers (with an F-statistic well above
the rule of thumb threshold of ten).
In addition, it is assumed that the instrument is exogenous (i.e., its effect on
an individual’s own borrowing runs through perceived peer income, but not
other factors). Note that our model takes into account various determinants of
borrowing, including own education, the education of peers, own income and
idiosyncratic income shocks, as well as province and time fixed effects.20 One
potential concern is that, if workers who do not work in high-tech sectors are in
fact complementary to growth in these high-tech industries, then they are likely
to move closer to these industries. This could possibly affect house prices in
18
“High-tech sector” refers to both high-tech manufacturing industries (the manufacturers of basic pharmaceutical
products and pharmaceutical preparation computer, electronic, and optical products) and high-tech knowledge-
intensive services (motion picture, video, and television program production, sound recording and music
publishing activities, programming and broadcasting activities, telecommunications, computer programming,
consultancy and related activities, information service activities, scientific research and development).
19 Virtually all heads of households in the sample have completed full-time education and were not attending any
(full- or part-time) education program at the time of the interview. Hence, it is quite unlikely that relatively
less-educated individuals living in regions with a high fraction of high-tech sector jobs would decide to borrow
to invest in their human capital and thereby improve their career prospects.
20 Province fixed effects serve to absorb any regional disparities (e.g., due to development, unemployment, or
bank diffusion) that are likely to have a direct influence on individual borrowing. Time fixed effects absorb any
common time trend, whereas their interactions with provinces take into account any region-specific time trend.
Peers’ average level of education takes into account the educational attainment of peers that can be relevant for
finding jobs in the high-tech sector (i.e., college or postsecondary education).
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the area and anticipated wage growth, both of which could contribute to greater
borrowing. Although we cannot explicitly rule out this possibility, as we show
below, our key findings remain unaffected when we control for yearly growth in
housing prices by province and for expectations regarding future own income.
In light of the above, we assume that, conditional on the rich set of controls
in our model, regional variation in employment rates in high-tech industry
interacted with the educational gap between the respondent and peers, does
not affect the tendency to borrow and the size of loan directly but through its
correlation with the respondent’s perception of average peer income. In the
section to follow, we first present our baseline results and our results from
endogeneity tests and instrumental variable models. In Section 4, we provide
details and present results from our second identification strategy, which relies
on placebo regressions.
3. Results for the Role of Peer Income in Borrowing Behavior
In this section, we report the results from our baseline specification for
collateralized and consumer (uncollateralized) loans. We use Equation (1) to
estimate prevalence and (conditional) amounts outstanding for each loan type
by means of both linear (ordinary least squares [OLS]) and nonlinear models
(i.e., probit for prevalence and Tobit for amounts outstanding). For each of
these models, we also test for the possible endogeneity of the income of peers
based on a Hausman test that is robust to heteroscedasticity.21 Under the null of
no endogeneity, the estimates from the baseline model are consistent and more
efficient and should be preferred to those derived from IVs. For completeness,
we report the results from both the baseline estimates and their IV counterparts
in all cases. Moreover, to make economic sense of our findings, we compute
and show the average marginal effects for all models (along with their standard
errors clustered at the household level).
Table 2A presents the results for collateralized loans. We estimate a
statistically significant effect of the perceived average household income of the
social circle (based on an assumed 12,000 euro annual increase), both on the
likelihood of having a collateralized loan and on the (conditional) outstanding
amount.22 The estimated marginal effects from the OLS and probit are 4 pp,
21 The test is implemented as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics, one calculated for the baseline equation,
where income of peers is treated as endogenous, and the other for the baseline equation augmented by the
instrument in which income of peers is treated as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis that the income of peers
can actually be treated as exogenous, this C-statistic is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom.
We have also tested for endogeneity of the linear models using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test and of
the nonlinear models using the two-step procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988). Results from these alternative
tests are entirely consistent with those reported in Tables 2A and 2B.
22 Our specification allows for nonlinear effects of household net income, financial and real wealth, and peers’ net
income (all of which have skewed distributions) by means of an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation
(i.e., log(x+(x2+1)1/2). The advantage of this near-logarithmic transformation is that it is defined for zero and
negative values (see also Pence 2006). Our results are robust to alternative specifications of the aforementioned
covariates (e.g., dummies denoting quartiles).
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implying an almost 10% net contribution to the unconditional likelihood of
having a mortgage. The estimated effects from the OLS and Tobit suggest
a conditional elasticity of approximately 0.46, corresponding roughly to a
15,000 euro increase in the amount borrowed by a typical household with
collateralized debt.23 According to the Hausman tests (reported at the bottom
of table), we fail to reject the null of peer income exogeneity, with p-values
ranging from 0.19 to 0.24. The results from all instrumented OLS, probit, and
Tobit models yield estimates that are positive, almost double the size of the
non instrumented ones, and statistically significant (with p-values less than
0.02).
Because our baseline specification allows for interactions between year and
province fixed effects, it is flexible enough to account for any region-specific
time trends that may influence individual borrowing decisions. Nonetheless,
because the period under study is marked by a dramatic appreciation in
housing prices and an increase in the home ownership rates relevant for
collateralized debt, we perform additional tests on the robustness of our
findings. Specifically, we estimate various specifications that control for year
and province fixed effects, as well as for province-specific time trends of
certain housing indicators. Table A4 reports results from the specifications
with the province-specific yearly growth rates of housing prices, housing
stock, and aggregate homeownership rates. We also estimate a specification
with a quadratic time trend by province. In all cases, the results from
both the probit and Tobit models are very similar to those derived under
our baseline specification, which allows for any region-specific time trends
by taking into account the interaction between province and time fixed
effects.
Next, we test the sensitivity of our findings to the difference between
collateralized borrowing for housing purchases and that for home equity
extraction. Because our data do not allow for a direct distinction, we use the
outstanding amount of the first mortgage on the main residence as a lower-
bound estimate of the former. Our estimates of the marginal effects of peer
income on the first mortgage on the main residence are very similar to those
for total collateralized debt.24
Table 2B reports the estimates related to uncollateralized consumer loans.
We estimate a positive marginal effect of peer income on the probability of
having consumer loans from both the OLS and probit models of the order of
1.6 pp (i.e., contributing approximately 7% to the unconditional likelihood
23 This calculation is based on conditional medians of collateralized debt (98,000 euro) and of peers’income (34,500
euro) among households with outstanding collateral loans.
24 The conditional median (mean) outstanding amount of the first mortgage on the main residence is 83,194
euro (102,921 euro), with an average prevalence of 36%. Hence, this first mortgage accounts for most of the
collateralized borrowing over the period under study. The estimated marginal effect (p-value) from probit on
peer income is 4.1 pp (p-value is less than 0.001), whereas the corresponding estimated conditional elasticity
from Tobit is 0.49 (p-value is less than 0.001).
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Table 2C
Auxiliary regressions
(I) (II)
IHS(avg. peer income) IHS(avg. peer income)
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Age 0.022 0.004∗∗∗ 0.022 0.004∗∗∗
Ageˆ2 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Male −0.017 0.019 −0.015 0.020
Couple 0.179 0.020∗∗∗ 0.182 0.020∗∗∗
No. of children 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.008
High school education 0.238 0.025∗∗∗ 0.237 0.025∗∗∗
College degree 0.416 0.031∗∗∗ 0.417 0.031∗∗∗
Employed 0.115 0.026∗∗∗ 0.120 0.027∗∗∗
Self-employed 0.108 0.058∗ 0.109 0.059∗
Retired 0.065 0.031∗∗ 0.063 0.031∗∗
Unemployed 0.123 0.060∗∗ 0.106 0.061∗
Last year inc.: unusually low −0.125 0.034∗∗∗ −0.122 0.034∗∗∗
Health poor/ fair −0.028 0.017 −0.029 0.017∗
IHS(net hh income) 0.014 0.003∗∗∗ 0.014 0.003∗∗∗
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.003 0.001∗∗ 0.003 0.001∗∗
IHS(net real wealth) 0.007 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007 0.002∗∗∗
Ability to borrow from soc.circ. 0.029 0.016∗ 0.030 0.016∗
Get advice from soc.circ. −0.004 0.015 −0.003 0.016
avg. peer education 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Province dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Province x year dummies yes yes
Constant 9.498 0.125∗∗∗ 9.493 0.126∗∗∗
(avg. peer Educat. - own Educat.) 0.036 0.003∗∗∗ 0.036 0.003∗∗∗
*Regional empl. % in high tech
F-statistic - instruments (p-value) 138.99 0.00∗∗∗ 135.92 0.00∗∗∗
Number of observations 4,362 4,257
The table reports the firststage regressions (I) and (II) used to estimate instrumental variable models for
collateralized (Table 2A) and consumer (Table 2B) loans, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
of having such loans). The corresponding elasticities of the size of consumer
loans conditional on borrowing to peer income are of the order of 0.16 (OLS)
to 0.24 (Tobit). The latter implies an increase of approximately 400 euro in
the amount borrowed by a typical borrower.25 We fail to reject the null of peer
income exogeneity in all OLS, probit, and Tobit models by a wide margin (with
p-values ranging from 0.67 to 0.97). In view of this, our preferred estimates
are those of the baseline models that are less biased compared with their IV
counterparts (see Baum 2008).
4. Placebo Tests and Additional Robustness Exercises
To further investigate the issue of endogenous peer income, we perform a
series of placebo tests to guard against the possibility of unobserved factors
that influence both income and the borrowing choices of those of similar ages
25 Based on the conditional medians of uncollateralized debt (4,000 euro) and peers’ income (26,000 euro) among
households with consumer loans.
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and educations living in the same province. The underlying rationale is that if
such factors were important, they would operate for any social circle sharing
those characteristics and not only for the respondent’s specific social circle.
To conduct the placebo test, we construct cells based on respondents’ age,
education, province of residence, and interview year. Suppose that there are
g∗ =1,...,G∗ such cells and i =1,...Ng∗ households in each cell. For each
household in a given cell, we then assign the perceived peer income of another
randomly selected household in that same cell (xˆg∗ ). We estimate the following
specification:
yig =βxxig +γxˆ xˆg∗ +Z
′
1,igβ+Z
′
2,gγ +εig. (2)
The results from these placebo regressions are summarized in Table 3, Panels
A1 and A2. Unlike the income of the respondents’ actual social circle (i.e.,
xg in Equation 1), the randomly assigned income of acquaintances (xˆg∗ ) is
insignificant across all specifications (with p-values well above 0.40 and
estimated magnitudes that are economically unimportant). We also perform
additional placebo tests based on cells constructed using various combinations
of the aforementioned traits and respondents’ gender. In no cases do we find
any significant effects for the (randomly assigned) incomes of acquaintances.
These results further support the premise that the estimated effects of average
peer income in our baseline specification reflect the effects of comparisons to
peers, rather than being a relic of social group characteristics.
We next consider the possibility of unobserved factors that systematically
influence both the propensity to borrow and the association with more affluent
peers. If such factors exist, it would seem plausible that perceived peer income
would have a stronger effect on borrowing among those who have received
financial advice from friends and/or plan to borrow from friends in the future,
two attributes directly recorded in the DNBHS data. We test for this possibility
by introducing interaction terms into the baseline models between peer income
and two dummies representing these attributes. In all the estimations, the two
interaction terms are jointly statistically insignificant at 10%.
Our third approach to assessing the potential relevance of unobserved factors
for peer income is to take into account the entire set of peer characteristics asked
about in the survey. To do so, we re-estimate the baseline models for loans
(Equation 1), including the vector Z2,g , which comprises peer characteristics
other than income, namely, the average age, education, household size, and
employment status of the social circle. In all cases, the estimated effects on peer
income in terms of magnitude, sign, and significance remain unchanged, and the
additional social circle characteristics prove mostly statistically insignificant
(Table 3, Panels B1 and B2).
Lastly, we check the sensitivity of our findings to an income measure
that is less volatile to temporary idiosyncratic shocks and local time trends
than the current household income used in our baseline specifications. We
follow Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi (2005), who apply a standard life
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Table 3
Placebo regressions and robustness specifications
Panel A: I Placebo regressions: collateralized loans
Pr(collateralized loans>0) E(log(collat. loans)|collat. loans)>0
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.005 0.006 0.067 0.082
Panel A: II Placebo regressions: consumer loans
Pr(consumer loans>0) E(log(cons. loans)|cons. loans)>0
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.055
Panel B: I All peer characteristics: collateralized loans
Pr(collateralized loans>0) E(log(collat. loans)|collat. loans)>0
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.041 0.008∗∗∗ 0.467 0.086∗∗∗
avg. peer education 0.016 0.021 0.188 0.237
avg. peer age −0.002 0.002 −0.023 0.021
avg. peer household size 0.004 0.011 0.046 0.128
avg. peer self-employed −0.016 0.045 −0.166 0.487
avg. peer employed 0.002 0.032 0.066 0.389
Panel B: II All peer characteristics: consumer loans
Pr(consumer loans>0) E(log(cons. loans)|cons. loans)>0
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.017 0.006∗∗∗ 0.264 0.082∗∗∗
avg. peer education −0.007 0.014 −0.133 0.197
avg. peer age 0.000 0.001 −0.018 0.018
avg. peer household size −0.012 0.008 −0.171 0.108
avg. peer self-employed 0.049 0.032 0.850 0.466∗
avg. peer employed 0.024 0.020 0.415 0.292
Panel C: I Estimated permanent income: collateralized loans
Pr(collateralized loans>0) E(log(collat. loans)|collat. loans)>0
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.033 0.009∗∗∗ 0.384 0.093∗∗∗
IHS(estimated permanent income) 0.038 0.012∗∗∗ 0.410 0.132∗∗∗
Panel C: II Estimated permanent income: consumer loans
Pr(consumer loans>0) E(log(cons. loans)|cons. loans)>0
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.017 0.006∗∗∗ 0.268 0.090∗∗∗
IHS(estimated permanent income) 0.007 0.008 0.087 0.099
Panels A1 and A2 report marginal effects (and associated standard errors) of peer income for collateralized and
consumer loans, respectively, derived from placebo probit and Tobit regressions. To that effect, each respondent
in a given age, education, province, and interview year cell has been randomly assigned the peer income of
another respondent in the same cell. Panels B1 and B2 report marginal effects (and associated standard errors)
for collateralized and consumer loans, respectively, derived from probit and Tobit regressions that take into
account the entire set of peer characteristics asked about in the survey (i.e., the average peer income, age,
education, household size, and employment status of the social circle). Panels C1 and C2 report marginal effects
(and associated standard errors) of the covariates of interest for collateralized and consumer loans, respectively,
derived from probit and Tobit regressions in which current household own income has been replaced by an
estimate of permanent household income (based on Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi 2005). The marginal effects
for peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. All specifications in
Panels A–C condition also on the set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Tables 2A and 2B.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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cycle permanent income hypothesis model to DNBHS data,26 and estimate a
measure of permanent income for each household that represents the discounted
present value of its future lifetime resources. More specifically, we regress
noncapital income on an age spline, the interactions between age and education,
gender, and family size, while controlling for household fixed effects, and
then compute a measure of household permanent income by deriving predicted
expected incomes at different ages for each household.27 We use this measure
(instead of current household income, xig) to re-estimate Equation (1) for
the two types of loans, but our results (Table 3, Panels C1 and C2) remain
unaffected.
5. Investigating the Nature of the Peer Income Effects
It is plausible to suppose that the effects of perceived social circle income on
loan behavior depend on whether the individual’s own income is above or below
that perceived level. In other words, we would expect that peer income more
greatly affects those who perceive themselves as poorer than their peers than
those who feel richer. We allow for such asymmetry by replacing peer income
in our baseline models (Tables 2A and 2B) with two terms denoting positive
and negative differences between the respondent and peer income. Formally,
we estimate the following specification:
yig =δ1di
(
xig −xg
)
+δ2(di −1)
(
xig −xg
)
+Z′1,igβ+Z
′
2,gγ +εig, (3)
where di takes value of one if xig −xg0 and zero otherwise.28 Results from
the nonlinear models for the two types of debt are reported in Table 4. For
respondents who are poorer than they perceive their acquaintances to be,
an assumed increase in their social circle’s annual income of 12,000 euro
(which raises the income gap relative to their peers) increases the probability
of obtaining a collateralized loan by 3.5 pp and a consumer loan by 1 pp. In
fact, it is only the effects for those who perceive themselves as poorer than their
social circle that are statistically significant, with respect to both participation
and to conditional amounts.
Therefore, our results suggest that peer income and how it compares to
the household’s own income tend to influence borrowing. This tendency
to obtain consumer loans and increase their size conditional on obtaining
them is presumably motivated by a plan to boost consumer spending. The
26 We are grateful to Rob Alessie for providing the code to calculate the permanent household income.
27 Following Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi (2005), we assume a constant interest rate of 3% and a life expectancy
of 80 years (which roughly corresponds to the average life expectancy in the Netherlands between 2000 and
2010).
28 In a linear regression model, the coefficient of the average perceived peers’ income parameter, γx , is a weighted
average of −δ1 and δ2. The relationship is more complicated for average marginal effects in the probit and Tobit
models, which we report in Table 4, due to nonlinearities.
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Table 4
Asymmetric effects of peer income
Panel A: Collateralized loans
Pr(collateralized loans>0) E(log(collat. loans)|collat. loans>0)
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(own income)-IHS −0.006 0.006 −0.030 0.065
(avg. peer income)>0
IHS(own income)-IHS 0.035 0.005∗∗∗ 0.308 0.042∗∗∗
(avg. peer income)<0
Panel B: Consumer loans
Pr(consumer loans>0) E(log(cons. loans)|cons. loans>0)
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(own income)-IHS 0.004 0.004 0.051 0.053
(avg. peer income)>0
IHS(own income)-IHS 0.011 0.003∗∗∗ 0.175 0.050∗∗∗
(avg. peer income)<0
Selected marginal effects (and associated standard errors) from probit and Tobit regressions for collateralized
(Panel A) and consumer loans (Panel B). All specifications condition on the same set of covariates used in the
baseline specifications in Tables 2A and 2B, except from peer income that has been replaced by two indicators
denoting positive and negative differences between respondent and peer income. The marginal effects of the
relevant indicators are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of peer income. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
corresponding tendency for collateralized loans stems from efforts to acquire
collateral assets of higher value. Thus, in what follows we take a closer look at
the nature of the comparison income effect.
First, we look for evidence that at least part of the peer income effect can
be attributed to a conspicuous consumption channel, for example, whether it
comes from a comparison with peers’ ability to spend on consumer goods.
To this end, we use responses to a direct survey question on whether
respondents see their acquaintances as having “more money to spend” than
they do, coded on a seven-point ordinal scale from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree.” This reference to “money to spend” invites respondents
to consider not only income but also the basic inelastic expenditure needs
of their acquaintances (e.g., household size). For our part, this focus on
others’ spending ability allows assessment of whether the intensity of such
a perception has an independent influence on consumer loans. To gain
similar insights regarding collateralized loans, one would need to have
direct information on respondents’ perceptions of the social circle’s housing
and living arrangements.29 Unfortunately, our data do not provide such
information.
In Table 5 (Panel A) we present results from our baseline specification for
(uncollateralized) consumer loans, augmented by an ordinal variable denoting
29 Note that more than 90% of the outstanding collateralized debt of individuals with such debt is mortgages, with
little variation over time.
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degree of agreement with the statement that “acquaintances have more money
to spend” than does the respondent. Estimated marginal effects on this ordinal
variable are positive and statistically significant for both participation and
conditional amounts. Our results provide support to the hypothesis that a direct
comparison with spending standards of peers partly influences the tendency
of households to have uncollateralized loans, without making perceived peer
income insignificant.
Probing further into the nature of the comparison effect of average peer
income, we also examine whether part of the effect is linked to a “tunnel
effect.” The “tunnel effect” is likely to arise because higher peer incomes
signal the potential for one’s own higher income in the future. To this
end, we consider two alternative measures. First, we take into account
respondents’ reported expectations about minimum possible incomes in the
next year. Second, we control for a measure of permanent income that
represents discounted lifetime resources.30 Both measures imply a positive
and statistically significant effect in the specifications modeling collateralized
debt (Table 5, Panel B), thereby supporting the presence of a “tunnel effect”
for this type of loan. Nonetheless, the fact that including additional controls
results in smaller, but still significant, marginal effects of perceived average
peer income on borrowing suggests that the “tunnel effect” does not fully
explain the influence of peer income. The remaining effects may well reflect
alternative considerations that are not captured by the comparison effect proxy
(included in the specification for consumer loans), such as envy or concerns
about status.
Finding social effects on borrowing does not necessarily imply suboptimal
or irrational behavior. Households may well borrow more because they have
relative status concerns, but this does not necessarily mean that they do not plan
to honor these debts. To examine the extent to which the perceived income
of peers contributes to potential financial distress, we regress loan-to-value
ratios and debt-service ratios on the perceived average income of peers and
on the array of socioeconomic covariates used in our baseline specification
(Equation 1). The Hausman exogeneity tests (not reported) show no evidence
of endogenous peer income in either equation (p-values > 0.4). The average
marginal effects from the Tobit regressions, reported in Table 6, imply that
an assumed 12,000 euro increase in the perceived annual income of peers
contributes 1.2 pp to an average loan-to-value ratio of 18% and 0.3 pp to an
average debt-service ratio of 6%.31
These findings suggest that social comparisons contribute to the likelihood of
households borrowing more and finding themselves in financial distress ex post,
30 The construction of the measure of permanent income is discussed in Section 4. Estimated marginal effects on
permanent income refer to changes, net of current household income, which enters as an independent control in
the specification.
31 Calculations are based on a median peer income of 33,000 euro.
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Table 6
Peer Income and overindebtedness
E(loan to value ratio) E(debt service ratio)
M.E. SE M.E. SE
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0345 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0095 0.0034∗∗∗
Age −0.0039 0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0006 0.0005
Male −0.0046 0.0161 0.0118 0.0109
Couple 0.1156 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0293 0.0107∗∗∗
No. of children 0.0102 0.0077 0.0005 0.0045
High school education −0.0016 0.0189 0.0202 0.0116∗
College degree 0.0362 0.0211∗ 0.0326 0.0125∗∗∗
Other education 0.0708 0.1179 0.0510 0.0786
Employed 0.0713 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0345 0.0152∗∗
Self-employed 0.0876 0.0394∗∗ 0.0201 0.0230
Retired 0.0466 0.0250∗ 0.0184 0.0164
Unemployed 0.0178 0.0478 0.0285 0.0308
Last year inc.: unusually low −0.0940 0.0224∗∗∗ −0.0495 0.0118∗∗∗
Health poor/ fair −0.0172 0.0138 −0.0096 0.0089
IHS(net hh income) 0.0107 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0184 0.0017∗∗∗
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0118 0.0049∗∗ 0.0017 0.0025
IHS(net real wealth) −0.0031 0.0072 0.0242 0.0042∗∗∗
Ability to borrow from soc.circ. −0.0129 0.0125 −0.0043 0.0079
Get advice from soc.circ. −0.0321 0.0135∗∗ −0.0089 0.0083
avg. peer education 0.0103 0.0132 −0.0027 0.0086
Province dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Province x year dummies yes yes
Number of observations 4,504 3,722
Marginal effects (and associated standard errors) from Tobit regressions used to model loan-to-value and debt-
service ratios, as indicators of potential financial distress. The marginal effects for peer income are based on a
12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and
clustered at the household level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
but they do not necessarily imply that socially induced additional borrowing is
irrational in the sense of violating the ex ante borrowing constraint at the time it
is undertaken. Moreover, our findings on socially induced borrowing point to a
demand-side factor affecting households with lower incomes than their peers,
but normally lower incomes discourage financial institutions from extending a
loan. Nevertheless, recent studies have found that, prior to the recent financial
crisis, lenders relaxed their standards and were willing to let subprime or other
less qualified borrowers carry substantial debt.32
6. Concluding Remarks
As discussed initially, although social influences can have notably distinct
implications for consumption versus borrowing, the extant research tends to
focus on identifying the social effects for the former. In this paper, we use
unique information from the DNB’s household survey, which is representative
32 Mian and Sufi (2009) show a shift in credit supply to be a key factor in the expansion of subprime mortgages
in the United States; Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2012) find that the quality of such loans deteriorated for
six consecutive years prior to the crisis; Christelis, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2013) show that, prior to the
crisis, older U.S. households had much higher mortgages than did European ones with similar characteristics
and resources.
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of the entire Dutch population, to assess the effects of social interactions on
the tendency to take on different types of debt, the size of loans conditional on
obtaining them, and indicators of potential financial distress. Particularly, we
exploit respondents’directly elicited perceptions of the average income in their
social circle and the ability of their peers to spend, thereby circumventing the
need to construct a hypothesized social circle based on arbitrary assumptions
about its members’ characteristics.
We find that the higher the perceived income of a social circle is, the greater
the tendency is that respondents will have outstanding and sizeable loans. This
finding holds true for both collateralized loans and uncollateralized consumer
loans once such factors as household resources, reception of financial advice
from the social circle, and belief in future borrowing from its members are
controlled for. The effect is significant for those who see themselves as having
lower income than their social circle.
We also find that once the perceived average income of the social circle is
controlled for, the tendency of households to take out uncollateralized loans
is partly related to the perceived spending ability of social circle members.
Moreover, household expectations about the next period’s (minimum) income
are statistically significant for collateralized loans but do not render peers’
perceived incomes insignificant. This finding suggests that average peer income
does not simply reveal prospects for the future income of the respondent
(a mere “tunnel effect”) but also represents a comparison or envy effect.
The role of comparison is also not confined to the tendency to borrow
and the outstanding borrowing amount: it also extends to potential financial
distress.
Overall, our study reveals a clear potential for social influences on household
borrowing behavior. Particularly, those who perceive others as having higher
average incomes not only try (as earlier studies show) to emulate their spending
but also decide to borrow more. Although our analysis does not rule out
that much of this socially induced additional borrowing is repayable, at least
ex ante, our finding that it tends to worsen indicators of potential financial
distress suggests that repayment problems might still occur ex post, especially
if borrowers and lenders fail to take proper account of all relevant risk
factors.
Appendix A. Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics
A.1. Types of debt
Collateralized loans: Debts on hire-purchase contracts; debts based on payment by installment;
equity based loans; debts with mail-order firms, shops or other retail business; mortgages on main
house, second house and other pieces of real estate.
Consumer loans: Private loans; extended lines of credit (unrelated to home equity); study loans;
credit card debts; other loans.
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Table A1
Summary statistics: Various demographics
Variable Average SD Number of observations
Age 48.23 15.41 14,893
Male 0.53 0.50 14,892
Couple 0.64 0.48 14,893
Number of children 0.64 1.03 14,893
Education dummies:
Less than high school 0.27 0.44 14,815
High school 0.34 0.48 14,815
College degree 0.38 0.48 14,815
Other education 0.01 0.11 14,815
Labour market status dummies:
Unemployed 0.02 0.14 14,889
Employed 0.54 0.50 14,889
Self-employed 0.04 0.20 14,889
Retired 0.17 0.37 14,889
Other status 0.23 0.42 14,889
Last year income: unusually low 0.07 0.25 11,342
Health poor/fair 0.28 0.45 11,791
Ability to borrow from soc. circle 0.28 0.45 8,782
Get financial advice from friends 0.34 0.47 11,454
Soc. circle has more money to spend than I do 3.85 1.47 8,939
Loan-to-value ratio 0.18 0.30 13,081
Debt servicing ratio 0.06 0.15 10,215
Weighted statistics from waves 2001–2008 of DNBHS data.
A.2. Questions on characteristics of the social circle
The following questions concern your circle of acquaintances, that is, the people with whom you
associate frequently, such as friends, neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people at work.
KENLTD. If you think of your circle of acquaintances, into which age category do MOST of these
people go? Please select the answer that is closest to reality. Age (in years) is mostly: under 16;
16–20; 21–25; 26–30; 31–35; 36–40; 41–45; 46–50; 51–55; 56–60; 61–65; 66–70; 71 or over.
KENHH. The people in your circle of acquaintances may live alone or share a household with
other people (e.g., a partner and children). Of how many persons do MOST households of your
acquaintances consist? One person; two persons; three persons; four persons; five persons; six
persons or more.
KENINK. How much do you think is theAVERAGE total net income per year of those households?
Less than E8,000 per year; E8,000–9,500; E9,500–11,000; E11,000–13,000; E13,000–
16,000;E16,000–20,000;E20,000–28,000;E28,000–38,000;E38,000–50,000;E50,000–75,000;
E75,000 or more; don’t know.
KENOPL. Which level of education do MOST of your acquaintances have? Primary education;
junior vocational training; lower secondary education; secondary education/preuniversity
education; senior vocational training; vocational colleges/first year university education; university
education.
KENWERK. Which kind of employment do MOST of your acquaintances have? Self-employed;
practicing a free profession; working in the family business; employed on a contractual basis;
mostly no paid job.
MANUUR (VROUWUUR). If you think of the MEN (WOMEN) among your acquaintances, how
many hours per week do they work on average?
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Table A2
Summary statistics: Various economic indicators
Variable Mean SD 25th perc. Median 75th perc. Number of obs.
Avg. peer income 31,807 13,955 24,000 33,000 36,941 6,872
Net hh income 27,617 23,638 15,943 24,687 35,886 10,031
Net financial wealth 36,137 100,092 1,393 10,847 36,430 11,412
Net real wealth 102,417 179,408 0 11,913 163,576 13,245
Perceived lower bound on 17,500 36,683 2,134 14,434 26,387 11,049
next period’s income
Weighted statistics from waves 2001–2008 of DNBHS data. Amounts refer to constant 2008 euro.
Table A3
Effects of peer income (taking into account “do not know” responses)
Panel A: Collateralized loans
Pr(collateralized loans>0) E(log(collat. loans)|collat. loans)>0
M.E. s.e. M.E. s.e.
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.039 0.009∗∗∗ 0.448 0.088∗∗∗
Number of observations 6,373 6,373
Panel B: Consumer loans
Pr(consumer loans>0) E(log(cons. loans)|cons. loans)>0
M.E. s.e. M.E. s.e.
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.016 0.006∗∗∗ 0.232 0.081∗∗∗
Number of observations 6,373 6,373
Marginal effects (and associated standard errors) from probit and Tobit regressions for collateralized (Panel A)
and consumer (Panel B) loans. All specifications condition on the same set of covariates used in the baseline
specifications in Tables 2A and 2B and a “flag” dummy denoting households that answer “do not know” to the
peer income question. The reported marginal effects for peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase
of the underlying covariate. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
A.3. Other questions
Ability to borrow from social circle. Yes to “Are you currently in a position to borrow a substantial
sum of money from family or friends?” (LENEN=1)
Get financial advice from friends. When answering “parents, friends, or acquaintances” to the
following question: “What is your most important source of advice when you have to make
important financial decisions for the household?” (ADVIES=1).
Social circle has more money to spend than I do. “Other people in my environment have more
money to spend than I do. Please indicate to which extent you agree or disagree.” (SITUAT3: 1:
totally disagree . . . 7: totally agree).
Last year income: unusually low. “Is the income your household earned in the past 12 months
unusually high or low compared to the income you would expect in a ‘regular’ year, or is it
regular?” (INKNORM= 1: “Unusually low”).
Perceived lower bound on next period’s income. “What do you expect to be the LOWEST total net
monthly income your household may realize in the next 12 months? (HOOG).
Province of residence. Data provide information on household location in twelve Dutch provinces:
Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland, Gelderland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-
Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg.
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Appendix B. Calculation of Average Marginal Effects via Monte Carlo
Simulation
Given that marginal effects are non-linear functions of the estimated parameters, βˆ (either from
probit or Tobit models), we compute their point estimates and standard errors via Monte Carlo
simulation (Train 2003) using the following formula:
E (g(β))=∫g(β)f (β)dβ
where g(β) denotes the magnitude of interest and f (β) denotes the joint distribution of all the
elements in β. We implement this simulation estimator by drawing 500 times from the joint
distribution of the estimated vector of parameters βˆ under the assumption that it is asymptotically
normal with the mean and variance-covariance matrix equal to the maximum likelihood estimates.
Then, for a given parameter draw j , we generate the magnitude of interest g
(
βˆj
)
. We first calculate
this magnitude for each household in our sample and then calculate the average marginal effect
as the weighted average of the effect across all households in our sample using survey weights.33
We then estimate E (g(β)) and its standard error as the mean and standard deviation, respectively,
of the distribution of g
(
βˆj
)
over all parameter draws. Details on the formulae used to derive
unconditional and conditional marginal effects after the Tobit estimation can be found in Greene
(2000, Chapter 22).
In all tables the marginal effects for peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of
the underlying variable. The marginal effect for age is derived from a second order age polynomial
assuming a one year increase in age and the marginal effect for the number of children by assuming
one additional child. The marginal effects for household income, financial wealth, real wealth,
expected future income, and estimated permanent income are calculated assuming a one standard
deviation increase of the underlying covariates.
Appendix C. Induced Bias in the Case of Endogenous Peer Income
Let υig denote an unobserved factor that correlates both with own borrowing and the income of
peers. In this case, model (1) can be rewritten as follows:
yig =βxxig +γxxg +Z
′
1,igβ+Z
′
2,gγ +υig +εig. (C1)
Then, if E(xgυig) =0, the estimation of γx will be biased. As is shown in Greene (2000), the sign
of the bias can be easily determined only if the sign of E(xgυig) is known and υig is uncorrelated
with all other covariates in the model. However, this is quite unlikely to be the case in the context
of social interactions. In particular, if the unobserved factor correlates with peer income, xg , it also
likely correlates with a household’s own income (in which case E(xigυig) =0). If we assume that
υig is uncorrelated with all the covariates in vectors Z1,ig and Z2,g , the bias in the estimator of γx
would have the sign of the partial correlation of xg and υig :
Bias =
[
Cov
(
xgυig
)−Cov(xigυig
)]
/A, (C2)
where A is a positive number. Even assuming further that both covariances in (C2) are positive,
the sign of the bias is still undetermined.
Moffitt (2001) also considers the case of an average (across individuals within peers) unobserved
peer characteristic (i.e., υig =υg) and then shows that the covariance between peer-level variables
υg and xg would be higher than the covariance between a group-specific indicator (υg) and an
33 We do not evaluate marginal effects at sample means because this practice can lead to severely misleading results
(see Train 2003, 33–34).
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individual-level variable (xig), thus inducing an upward bias in the estimator of γx . This is not
necessarily the case in our set-up: each household reports the characteristics of its own peers;
therefore, xg has the same support as xig , which implies that nothing can be said about the relative
size of the two covariances even if the unobserved factor varies only by peer groups and not at the
household level. As a result, it is not possible to predict the sign of the bias.
Appendix D. Further Robustness Checks
We performed a number of checks in addition to those presented in the main text to ensure the
robustness of our findings. First, approximately 20% of the households answer “don’t know” to
the question regarding the perceived average income of their peers; thus, they are not used in our
baseline regressions. To examine the sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of these missing
observations, we have re-estimated all our baseline models presented in Tables 2A and 2B and add
a flag dummy to denote households answering that they do not know the income of their peers.
For these observations, missing incomes of the peers are replaced by zeros. The estimated average
marginal effects and associated standard errors for the income of peers from this larger sample of
households are presented in Table A3. Notably, the estimated magnitudes across all specifications
are very similar to those that we estimate in our baseline models.
Second, we experimented with different specifications that employ quartiles to model the income
of peers, and our results are robust to such transformations. Our results are also insensitive to
functional forms that use quartiles to model own income and/ or own financial and real wealth.
Third, our modeling strategy of borrowing behavior is quite standard in the household finance
literature and in line with life-cycle portfolio models in which households decide every period on
the allocation of their resources and the amount of borrowing. However, one may argue that for
many households with collateralized loans outstanding in a given period, the decision to take up
such loans (especially mortgages) was made many years prior to the interview. To examine the
sensitivity of our results to this issue, we have re-estimated our probit model for collateralized
loans, focusing only on households that take up such loans (i.e., switch borrowing status) during
the period covered by our data. Specifically, we use the sample of households without collateralized
loans in 2001 (i.e., the initial observation period in our sample) and estimate the probability of
taking up such a loan in any of the subsequent seven waves. This probit model conditions on the
same set of covariates as the one used in our baseline specification (presented in Table 2A). The
estimated marginal effect on the income of the peers is 2 pp, significant at 1%, and contributes
almost 20% to the unconditional probability of taking up a collateralized loan in this sample.
Thus, the estimated effects on the income of the peers from this ‘inflow’ sample are economically
important and relatively stronger than those in our baseline specification.
Fourth, one might argue that the estimated effects of the income of peers on collateralized loans
are partly due to expectations about future housing market conditions. To investigate this issue, we
estimated specifications of collateralized debt behavior that take into account, apart from peers’
income and expectations about next year’s own income, various expectations regarding future
conditions in housing and mortgage markets. These include whether respondents expect housing
prices to go up, whether they anticipate an increase in mortgage interest rates, and whether they
think that the tax deductibility of mortgage interest rates will be limited in the future. The results
(available upon request) suggest a significant negative relationship between an expected increase in
mortgage interest rates and collateralized debt, but they do not affect our baseline findings regarding
the significant role of the income of peers or of expectations about next year’s own income.
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